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CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE AND ANTI-AVOIDANCE  
BY THE ROBERTS COURT 




At the (apparent but not real) end of the October 2008 Supreme Court 
term, the Court took diametrically opposing positions in a pair of sensitive 
election law cases.  In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v Holder 
(NAMUDNO),1 the Court avoided deciding a thorny question about the 
constitutionality of a provision of the Voting Rights Act. The Court did so 
through a questionable application of the doctrine of “constitutional avoidance.”  
That doctrine (also known as the “avoidance canon”) encourages a court to adopt 
one of several plausible interpretations of a statute in order to avoid deciding a 
tough constitutional question.2 In NAMUDNO, however, the Court—without 
objection from single Justice—embraced a manifestly implausible statutory 
interpretation to avoid the constitutional question.3  
A week after NAMUDNO issued, the Court announced it would not be 
deciding a campaign finance case, Citizens United v Federal Election 
Commission,4 by the Court’s summer break as scheduled.  Instead, the Court set 
the case for reargument in September (before the start of the new Court term), 
expressly asking the parties to brief the question whether the Court should 
overturn two of its precedents upholding the constitutionality of corporate 
spending limits in candidate elections.5 The constitutional issue had been 
abandoned by the law’s challengers in the court below and was not even 
                                                                                                    
* William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  Thanks 
to Neal Devins, Ned Foley, Beth Garrett, Hal Krent, Nate Persily, Rick Pildes, and Mark Tushnet 
for useful comments and suggestions. This article went to press before the Court issued its opinion 
in the Citizens United case. 
1129 S Ct 2504 (2009). 
2 See Part I.A (describing doctrine). 
3 See Part II.A. 
4 129 S Ct 2893 (2009). 
5 Id. (“This case is restored to the calendar for reargument. The parties are directed to file 
supplemental briefs addressing the following question: For the proper disposition of this case, 
should the Court overrule either or both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 
(1990), and the part of McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), which 
addresses the facial validity of Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 
U.S.C. §441b?”). 
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mentioned in the challengers’ jurisdictional statement.6 Moreover, the 
constitutional question could easily be avoided through a plausible interpretation 
of the applicable campaign finance statute.  Thus, in Citizens United, the Court 
gave itself an opportunity to apply a little-noticed (and rarely used) tool of anti-
avoidance: the Court will eschew a plausible statutory interpretation in order 
decide a difficult constitutional question.7  It remains to be seen whether the Court 
will actually decide the constitutional question when it issues its decision.  But 
the reargument order itself was a use of the anti-avoidance tool: the Court went 
out of its way to make a thorny constitutional question more prominent by 
scheduling briefing and argument on it despite a plausible statutory escape hatch. 
In both cases the Court failed to follow the usual understanding of the 
avoidance canon: in NAMUDNO, the Court applied the canon to adopt an 
implausible reading of a statute that appeared contrary to textual analysis, 
congressional intent, and administrative interpretation.  In Citizens United, the 
Court failed to dispose of the case initially through a plausible reading of a 
statute, setting itself up to address a constitutional question head-on that was not 
properly presented to the Court.  What explains the divergent approaches in the 
two cases, and what does the divergence tell us about the Roberts Court?  In this 
Article, I describe the divergent approaches the Court took in these cases in detail 
and identify the evidence supporting three competing explanations for the Court’s 
actions, ranging from the most charitable to least charitable reading of the Court’s 
motives.   
First, the fruitful dialogue explanation posits that the Court will use 
constitutional avoidance only when doing so would further a dialogue with 
Congress that has a realistic chance of actually avoiding constitutional problems 
through redrafting.  On this reading, the Voting Rights Act got “remanded” to 
Congress because Congress may fix it in ways that do not violate the 
Constitution, but the corporate spending limits provision of federal campaign 
finance law perhaps does not deserve remand because the campaign finance laws 
are not constitutionally fixable.   
Second, the political legitimacy explanation posits that the Court uses the 
constitutional avoidance doctrine when it fears that a full-blown constitutional 
pronouncement would harm its legitimacy.  Some evidence supports this 
understanding.  In the same term that the Court avoided the constitutional 
question in NAMUDNO, it used the same avoidance canon to narrowly construe a 
                                                                                                    
6 See Part II.B. 
7 The discovery of the anti-avoidance tool lends some credence to Llewellyn’s complaint that 
every canon of construction has a contrary “counter-canon.”  Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the 
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to Be Construed, 3 
Vand L Rev (1950). 
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different provision of the Voting Rights Act in Bartlett v Strickland,8 and it 
applied constitutional avoidance (in deed if not in name) to narrowly construe 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in Ricci v DeStefano,9 the controversial 
New Haven firefighters case.  Each of these cases involved tough questions of 
race relations whose resolution could harm the Court’s legitimacy.  In contrast, 
campaign finance issues are much lower salience to the public, and are less likely 
to arouse the passion of interest groups and perhaps the ire of Congress.   
Third, the political calculus explanation posits that the Court uses 
constitutional avoidance to soften public and Congressional resistance to the 
Court’s movement of the law in a direction that the Court prefers as a matter of 
policy.  Under this positive political theory explanation of the Court’s actions, the 
difference between NAMUDNO and Citizens United is simply one of timing, and 
the cases are not so different after all.  The Court had already laid the groundwork 
for a deregulatory campaign finance regime through its earlier campaign finance 
rulings: it may now be ready to put a stake in the heart of the corporate spending 
limits.  Under that reading, the Voting Rights Act’s time of demise will come, and 
the public will come to expect it once the Court first raised constitutional doubts 
in NAMUDNO. The avoidance canon is just another doctrinal tool in the Court’s 
arsenal to move constitutional law and policy in the Court’s direction and at the 
Court’s chosen speed. Like the political legitimacy argument, the political 
calculus argument is one about the Court’s legitimacy, but it is one that views the 
Court as strategic in pursuing an agenda rather than as fearful. 
While it is impossible to know which of these explanations is correct (and 
more than one may be in play for at least some of the Justices), the developments 
of the October 2008 term suggest that the constitutional avoidance doctrine offers 
broad clues about the Roberts Court and its willingness to make major changes to 
American constitutional law. In Part I, I briefly review justifications for and 
criticisms of the constitutional avoidance doctrine and survey the few decisions of 
the Roberts Court thus far applying the doctrine. Part II describes in greater detail 
the use of avoidance and anti-avoidance in NAMUDNO and Citizens United.  Part 
III explores the competing explanations for the Roberts Court’s selective use of 
constitutional avoidance doctrine. Whether intended or not, the use of 
constitutional avoidance and anti-avoidance allows the Court to control the speed 
and intensity of constitutional and policy change. 
 
I. 
A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE DOCTRINE 
AND ITS USE BY THE ROBERTS COURT 
                                                                                                    
8 129 S Ct 1231 (2009).  
9 129 S Ct 2658 (2009). 
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A. Justifications for, and Criticisms of, the Avoidance Canon10 
 
Roughly speaking, “canons” are rules of thumb or presumptions that 
courts use to interpret the meaning of statutes.  Constitutional avoidance (or the 
“avoidance canon”) is a substantive canon of statutory interpretation. Substantive 
canons “are generally meant to reflect a judicially preferred policy position.  
[They] reflect judicially-based concerns, grounded in the courts’ understanding of 
how to treat statutory text with reference to judicially perceived constitutional 
priorities, pre-enactment common law practices, or specific statutorily based 
policies.”11  Besides the avoidance canon, among the most important substantive 
canons are the rule of lenity (a “rule against applying punitive sanctions if there is 
ambiguity as to underlying criminal liability or criminal penalty”12) and a host of 
“federalism” canons protecting state sovereignty against congressional 
intrusion.13 
Substantive canons stand in contrast to language canons, which “consist of 
predictive guidelines as to what the legislature likely meant based on its choice of 
certain words rather than others, or its grammatical configuration of those words 
in a given sentence, or the relationship between those words and text found in 
other parts of the same statute or in similar statutes.”14   
Substantive canons are controversial.15 Eskridge and Frickey have 
defended them as part of an “interpretive regime” serving rule-of-law and 
coordination functions.16 That is, substantive canons can act as gap-filling devices 
                                                                                                    
10 I do not intend here to give a full-blown examination to the avoidance canon.  I rather sketch 
the main arguments to provide relevant context for the remainder of this Article. This section 
appears in similar form in Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 Stan L Rev 69 (2009). 
11 James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral 
Reasoning, 58 Vand L Rev 1, 13 (2005). 
12 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, & Elizabeth Garrett, Cases and Materials On 
Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy App. B 32 (West 4th ed. 2007).   
13 Id at App. B 30-32; see also below Parts III & IV. 
14 Brudney & Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 12 (cited in note 11). One of the most important 
language canons is the expessio unius canon, “the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion 
of others.”  Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation at App. B 19 (cited 
in note 12) (“expressio unius est exclusio alterius”).  Justice Scalia gives this example, “What [the 
expressio unius canon] means is this: If you see a sign that says children under twelve may enter 
free, you should have no need to ask whether your thirteen-year-old must pay.  The inclusion of 
the one class is an implicit exclusion of the other.” Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: 
Federal Courts and the Law 25 (Princeton U Press 1997). 
15 Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation at 945 (cited in note 12) 
(describing “intellectual warfare” over the canons).  
16 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term Foreword: Law 
as Equilibrium, 108 Harv L Rev 26, 66 (1994). 
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that provide clarity for the law and allow courts to signal policy preferences to 
legislatures, which may draft around such preferences when desired.17  Eskridge 
further defends them as “a way for ‘public values’ drawn from the Constitution, 
federal statutes, and the common law to play an important role in statutory 
interpretation.”18  
In contrast, Justice Scalia argues against substantive canons, which he 
characterizes as “the use of certain presumptions and rules of construction that 
load the dice for or against a particular result.”19  Calling substantive canons “a 
lot of trouble” to “the honest textualist,”20 Justice Scalia describes them 
indeterminate,21 leading to “unpredictability, if not arbitrariness” of judicial 
decisions.  He also questions “where courts get the authority to impose them,”22 
doubting whether courts can “really just decree we will interpret the laws that 
Congress passes to mean more or less than they fairly say.”23   
Despite these statements, Justice Scalia has approved of and repeatedly 
applied the avoidance canon,24 as have all other current members of the Supreme 
Court.  The avoidance canon provides that courts in appropriate circumstances 
should “avoid [statutory] interpretations that would render a statute 
unconstitutional or that would raise serious constitutional difficulties.”25  
Traditional supporters of the canon’s use raise three justifications. 
“First, [the avoidance canon] may be a rule of thumb for ascertaining 
legislative intent.”26 The underlying assumption is that Congress either prefers not 
to press the limits of the Constitution in its statutes, or it prefers a narrowed (and 
constitutional) version of its statutes to a statute completely stricken by Congress.  
This is the rationale often raised by the Supreme Court in applying the canon.27 
                                                                                                    
17 Id at 66-69. 
18 Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation at 48 (cited in note 12). 
19 Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 27 (cited in note 14). 
20 Id at 28. 
21 Id (“it is virtually impossible to expect uniformity and objectivity when there is added, on one 
side or the other, a thumb of indeterminate weight”). 
22 Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 29 (cited in note 14). 
23 Id.  
24 Id at 20 n.22.  See also Part I.B (discussing Justice Scalia’s opinions concerning the avoidance 
canon). 
25 Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation at App. B 29 (cited in note 
12).  The next section describes the mechanics of the canon in greater detail. 
26 Id at 918 (cited in note 12). 
27 See for example Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173, 191 (1991) (“This canon is followed out of 
respect for Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of constitutional limitations.”); Clark 
v Martinez, 543 US 371, 382 (2005) (“The canon is thus a means of giving effect to congressional 
intent, not of subverting it.”). 
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Second, the canon may provide “a low salience mechanism for giving 
effect to what Larry Sager calls ‘underenforced constitutional norms.’”28  As 
Eskridge explains: “While a Court that seeks to avoid judicial activism will be 
reluctant to invalidate federal statutes in close cases, it might seek other ways to 
protect constitutional norms.” One way is through canons of statutory 
construction.”29  Avoidance in effect remands the statute to Congress.  The canon 
“makes it harder for Congress to enact constitutionally questionable statutes and 
forces legislatures to reflect and deliberate before plunging into constitutionally 
sensitive issues.”30 
 Third, the canon may help “courts conserve their institutional capital,”31 
what I term the “political legitimacy” rationale. Phil Frickey has defended the 
early Warren Court avoidance decisions (many involving government action 
against Communists32) on legitimacy grounds, seeing avoidance as allowing “the 
[Warren] Court to slow down a political process that is moving too hastily and 
overriding human rights, but without incurring the full wrath of a political process 
that doesn’t like to be thwarted.”33 
Much other recent scholarship has expressed skepticism about the 
avoidance canon, at least as traditionally defended. Fred Schauer rejects the 
assumption that the avoidance canon furthers congressional intent, in the absence 
of any evidence that Congress would prefer a narrow interpretation of its statute 
to a Court actually confronting whether the statute passes constitutional muster.34  
                                                                                                    
28  Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation at 918 (cited in note 12). 
29 William G. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 286 (Harvard U Press 1994). 
30 Id. 
31Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation at 918 (cited in note 12). 
32 See Neal Devins, Constitutional Avoidance and the Roberts Court, 32 U Dayton L Rev 339-40 
(2007) (“During the 1956-1957 term of the Warren Court, twelve cases were decided involving 
Communists.  The Court ruled against the government in every case, though never on 
constitutional grounds.”). 
33 Id, citing Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal 
Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 Cal L Rev 
397 (2005).  
34 Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 S Ct Rev 71, 74; see also id at 92-93 (“there is 
no evidence whatsoever that members of Congress are risk-averse about the possibility that 
legislation they believe to be wise policy will be invalidated by the courts. On the contrary, given 
the essentially political nature of the job of legislating, and given that the American political 
system does not penalize legislators for voting for good (in the eyes of the voters) policies that are 
determined by the courts to be unconstitutional, one would expect members of Congress to be 
anything but risk-averse. One would expect them to err on the side of assuming constitutionality 
under conditions of uncertainty about what the courts are likely to do.”); Ernest A. Young, 
Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 Texas L 
Rev 1549, 1581 (2000) (arguing that the canon might actually undermine congressional intent: “a 
holding that constitutional doubts compel a narrow statutory construction has a ‘go ahead, make 
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Judge Friendly worried that the canon would be applied selectively, making it 
“have almost as many dangers as advantages.”35  Indeed, even Frickey rejects a 
view of the avoidance canon as tool of judicial modesty: “the avoidance canon is 
not so much a maxim of statutory interpretation as a tool of constitutional law…it 
involves judicial lawmaking not judicial restraint; the outcomes it produces are at 
least sometimes inconsistent with current congressional preferences; and it will 
not always foster a deliberative congressional response.”36 
Still other scholars, like Frickey, seek to rehabilitate the avoidance canon 
through a realist view of the Court’s power of judicial lawmaking.  Ernest Young, 
like Frickey, believes that the avoidance canon is a tool of constitutional 
adjudication, not statutory construction. Young views the avoidance canon as a 
“resistance norm,” an intermediate constitutional rule “that raises obstacles to 
particular governmental actions without barring those actions entirely.”37  Finally, 
Trevor Morrison adopts what might be called a “fence around the Torah”38 
defense of the canon: “the avoidance canon…guards the [constitutional] 
boundaries by making it more difficult for Congress even to approach them.”39 
In sum, though modern legislation scholars see the avoidance canon as 
sometimes playing an important role in Supreme Court adjudication and its 
relation with Congress, there seems to be consensus that the canon’s use signals a 
Court that is actively engaged in shaping law and policy, not acting modestly. 
 
B. The Scope of the Modern Avoidance Doctrine 
 
 I turn now away from the rationale for the avoidance canon and to its 
mechanics.  There are two main mechanical questions about when the canon 
                                                                                                                                     
my day’ quality to it, and Congress might reasonably conclude that enactment of the broader 
reading would only result in invalidation on the merits”). 
35 Henry Friendly, Benchmarks 211 (U Chicago Press 1967).  Judge Friendly remarked that 
challenging the avoidance canon “is rather like challenging the Holy Writ,” id, but he worried that 
wide use of the rule would become one of “evisceration and tergiversation.” Id at 212; see also 
Lisa Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 BC L Rev 1003 (1994). 
36 Frickey, 93 Cal L Rev at 402 (cited in note 33). 
37 Young, 78 Texas L Rev at 1585 (cited in note 34). 
38 In Jewish religious tradition, the oral law provided additional rules to supplement the written 
rules in the Torah and to make sure that those written rules were not violated.  “The rabbis used 
the metaphor of a fence around the Torah as a means of protecting the essence of Torah in the 
midst of the proliferation of new demands.” Perke Avot: A Modern Commentary on Jewish Ethics 
2 (Leonard Kravitz & Kerry M. Olitzky eds. and trans., URJ Press 1993). 
39 Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 Colum L Rev  
1189, 1217 (2006); see also United States v Marshall, 908 F2d 1312, 1318 (7th Cir 1990) 
(Easterbrook) (“The canon about avoiding constitutional decisions, in particular, must be used 
with case, for it is closer cousin to invalidation than to interpretation. It is a way to enforce the 
constitutional penumbra, and therefore an aspect of constitutional law proper.”). 
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should be invoked: first, how much constitutional doubt must there be before the 
canon comes into play?  Second, must the statute in question be truly ambiguous 
before the canon comes into play? 
 On the first point, Adrian Vermuele has traced the transformation of the 
doctrine from “classical avoidance” to “modern avoidance.”40  Under classical 
avoidance, a court would have to conclude that one interpretation of a statute 
would render the statute unconstitutional before the canon may be applied.  Under 
modern avoidance doctrine in contrast, the canon may be applied once the court 
concludes that one interpretation of the statute would raise serious doubts as to 
the constitutionality of the statute.  As Morrison explains, “modern avoidance 
departs from classical avoidance by allowing serious but potentially unavailing 
constitutional objections to dictate statutory meanings.”41   
 On the second question, the stated rule of the modern Court is that the 
avoidance canon only comes into play only when the statutory interpretation that 
avoids constitutional doubt is in fact reasonable or plausible: 
 
The doctrine of constitutional doubt does not require that the 
problem-avoiding construction be the preferable one—the one the 
Court would adopt in any event.  Such a standard would deprive 
the doctrine of all function.  “Adopt the interpretation that avoids 
the constitutional doubt if it is the right one” produces precisely 
the same result as “adopt the right interpretation.”  Rather, the 
doctrine of constitutional doubt comes into play when the statute is 
“susceptible of” the problem-avoiding interpretation—when that 
interpretation is reasonable, though not necessarily the best.42 
 
As Justice Scalia put it for a majority of the Court in 2005, the canon “is a 
tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, 
                                                                                                    
40 Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Georgetown LJ 1945, 1949 (1997). 
41 Morrison, 106 Colum L Rev at 1203 (cited in note 39); see also John Nagle, Delaware & 
Hudson Revisited, 72 Notre Dame L Rev 1495 (1997) (tracing history of “doubts” canon in 
detail). 
42 Almendarez-Torres v United States, 523 US 224, 270 (1998) (Scalia dissenting) (emphasis 
added and citations omitted).  Though Justice Scalia wrote this as part of his dissenting opinion, 
on this point, the majority agreed: “[For the canon to apply, t]he statute must be genuinely 
susceptible to two constructions after, and not before, its complexities are unraveled. Only then is 
the statutory construction that avoids the constitutional question a ‘fair’ one.”  Id at 238.  The 
majority and dissent disagreed in the Almendarez-Torres case over whether the statutory language 
at issue pointed “significantly in one direction,” id., and over whether there was “grave[] doubt” 
about the constitutionality of the statute under one of the interpretations.  Id at 239. 
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resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative 
which raises serious constitutional doubts.”43 
Despite the formal requirement of some kind of textual ambiguity to allow 
for the Court to adopt one of two reasonable interpretations, Frickey explains that 
“for the [Warren] Court…statutory textual ambiguity is not a necessary condition 
for invoking the canon.  Instead, what is needed is a judicial conclusion that 
Congress had not actively considered—and ideally, deliberated on—a matter of 
‘grave importance,’ especially when that involves underenforced constitutional 
norms.”44 
 The most recent extended Supreme Court debate over the scope of the 
avoidance canon occurred in 2005, during the last few months of the Rehnquist 
Court, in the case of Clark v Martinez.45  An alien who has been found to be 
inadmissible into the United States ordinarily must be removed from the country 
within 90 days.46 Clark concerned an immigration statute providing the Secretary 
of Homeland Security may detain an alien who has been found to be removable 
beyond this statutory 90-day removal period.47 Detained aliens who had never 
legally been admitted into the United States challenged “the Secretary [of 
Homeland Security]’s authority to continue to [indefinitely] detain an 
inadmissible alien subject to a removal order after the 90-day removal period has 
elapsed.”48  The Clark Court followed an earlier Supreme Court opinion 
construing the same statute to hold that aliens who had initially gained lawful 
entry in the U.S. presumptively could not be detained under the statute for more 
than six months after the 90-day removal period.49 In Clark, the Court held that 
the same rule applied to aliens who had never gained lawful entry to the 
country—even though the Secretary would not necessarily violate the 
Constitution by holding such aliens for a period exceeding six months. 
 In reaching the conclusion that the six-month presumptive period applied 
to aliens who had never gained lawful entry into the country, the Clark Court 
applied the avoidance canon.  The Court noted that the contrary interpretation of 
the statute urged by the government—allowing detention for more than six 
months—would raise serious constitutional concerns for aliens who had been 
lawfully been admitted into the country.   “If [one of two plausible statutory 
constructions] would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other 
                                                                                                    
43 Clark v Martinez, 543 US 371, 382 (2005) (emphasis added). 
44 Frickey, 93 Cal L Rev at 460-61 (cited in note 33). 
45 543 US 371 (2005). 
46 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) 
47 8 USC § 1231(a)(6). 
48 Clark, 543 US at 372.   
49 Zadvydas v Davis, 533 US 678 (2001). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1436669




should prevail—whether or not those constitutional problems pertain to the 
particular litigant before the Court.”50 
 The dissenters viewed this aspect of the Court’s ruling as an “end run 
around black-letter constitutional doctrine governing facial and as-applied 
challenges.”51  To the dissenters “an ambiguous statute should be read to avoid a 
constitutional doubt only if the statute is constitutionally doubtful as applied to 
the litigant before the court.”52  The dissenters argued that because the aliens 
before the Court in Clark could be held longer than six months without raising 
constitutional concerns, these aliens should not be able to rely upon the avoidance 
canon. 
 The majority rejected the dissent’s argument, holding that application of 
the avoidance canon furthered congressional intent: “when a litigant invokes the 
canon of avoidance, he is not attempting to vindicate the constitutional rights of 
others, as the dissent believes; he seeks to vindicate his own statutory rights.”53  
To the majority, the Court should presume Congress did not write a statute that 
would be unconstitutional in some of its applications.  The majority also pointed 
to an administrative concern with the dissent’s contrary rule, stating that the 
dissent’s rule would “render every statute a chameleon, its meaning subject to 
change depending on the presence or absence of constitutional concerns in each 
individual case.”54 
 The Court’s interesting disagreement in Clark over the relationship 
between the avoidance canon and as-applied challenges should not obscure the 
Court’s unanimity on basic points related to the avoidance canon.  All the Justices 
on the Clark Court accepted the avoidance canon as a legitimate tool of statutory 
interpretation and all believed it applied in cases there were two “plausible” 
interpretations of a statute, one of which raises serious constitutional doubts. 
(They differed only in whether those doubts had to involve the litigants before the 
Court.) Given this agreement on the fundamental contours of the avoidance 
canon, the Roberts Court has repeatedly cited to Clark for the black-letter of the 
avoidance canon. 
 
C. Constitutional Avoidance and the Roberts Court 
 
 The Roberts Court has not yet had the occasion to engage in any great 
debates about the meaning of the avoidance canon, but the canon was mentioned 
                                                                                                    
50 Clark, 543 US at 380-81. 
51 Id at 394 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
52 Id.   
53 Id at 382. 
54 Id. 
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in 13 cases from January 2006 to June 2009.55  The most important discussions of 
the canon thus far in the Roberts Court have come in controversial cases 
involving abortion, the detainment of unlawful enemy combatants at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, and in race cases. 
 In Gonzales v Carhart, the Court relied on the avoidance canon to 
interpret a federal abortion statute not to apply to certain abortion procedures.  
Justice Kennedy, for the majority, first quoted an earlier Court case for the 
proposition that it is an “elementary rule …. that every reasonable construction 
must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”56  He 
added that the avoidance canon “in the past has fallen by the wayside when the 
Court confronted a statute regulating abortion.  The Court at times employed an 
antagonistic canon of construction under which in cases involving abortion, a 
permissible reading of a statute [was] to be avoided at all costs.”57  Here, as 
described more in Part III below, Justice Kennedy recognized the occasional 
Court use of the anti-avoidance tool in the abortion context. 
 In Boumediene v Bush, the Court held that it could not construe the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, applicable to enemy combatants being held by 
                                                                                                    
55 Gonzales v Oregon, 546 US 243, 291-92 (2006) (Scalia dissenting) (arguing that the canon did 
not apply to Attorney General directive on assisted suicide); Kansas v Marsh, 548 US 163, 169 
(2006) (describing Kansas Supreme Court’s use of the doctrine); Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 
557, 584 n.15 (2006) (declining to decide “the manner in which the canon of constitutional 
avoidance should affect subsequent interpretation of the” Detainee Treatment Act); Rita v United 
States, 551 US 338 (2007) (Scalia dissenting) (criticizing majority for failure to follow Clark v 
Martinez rule); Office of Senator Mark Dayton v Hanson, 550 US 511, 514 (2007) (Court 
unanimously following Clark for “our established practice of interpreting statutes to avoid 
constitutional difficulties”); Gonzales v Carhart, 550 US 124, 153-54 (2007) (relying on 
avoidance canon to interpret federal abortion statute not to apply to certain abortion procedures); 
Gonzalez v United States, 128 S Ct 1765, 1771 (2008) (declining to apply avoidance canon 
because there was no serious constitutional doubt raised by one of the interpretations); 
Boumediene v Bush, 128 S Ct 2229, 2271-72 (2008) (declining to apply canon when the text and 
purpose require a contrary interpretation); Pearson v Callahan, 129 S Ct 808 821 (2008) 
(unanimous Court endorsing Justice Brandeis’s statement in Ashwander v TVA, 297 US 288, 347 
(1936) that “The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented 
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed 
of”); Bartlett v Strickland, 129 S Ct 1231, 1247-48 (2008) (relying on avoidance canon in 
declining to read section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to allow influence district claims); Hawaii v 
Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S Ct  1436, 1445 (2008) (applying Clark’s avoidance statement 
to congressional resolution concerning apology to Hawaii); Federal Communications Comm’n v 
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S Ct 1800, 1811-12 (2009) (holding that avoidance canon does 
not apply to “limit the scope of authorized executive action); Northwest Austin Municipal Utility 
District Number One v Holder, 129 S Ct  2504 (2009) (applying avoidance canon to section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act). 
56 550 US at 153. 
57 Id at 153-54 (internal quotations omitted). 
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the United States in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to give detainees at the Court of 
Appeals the “right to present relevant exculpatory evidence that was not 
presented” at an early military tribunal.58  The Court held that in applying the 
avoidance canon to the DTA, “[w]e cannot ignore the text and purpose of the 
statute in order to save it.”59  The majority concluded that “[t]he language of the 
statute, read in light of Congress’s reasons for enacting it” cannot bear the 
interpretation that allowed the presentation of such evidence.60 Accordingly the 
Court reached the constitutional question and held the procedure in the DTA that 
barred detainees from presenting exculpatory evidence to the Court of Appeals 
was unconstitutional. 
 In Bartlett v Strickland,61 the Court applied the avoidance canon to 
conclude that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act did not allow plaintiffs to raise 
“crossover district claims,” which would have had the effect of creating more 
electoral districts in which members of minority groups could elect candidates of 
their choice.62  “If § 2 were interpreted to require crossover districts throughout 
the nation, it would unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every redistricting, 
raising serious constitutional questions.”63  Such an interpretation “would reverse 
the canon of avoidance.  It invites the divisive constitutional questions that are 
both unnecessary and contrary to the purposes of our precedents under the Voting 
Rights Act.”64  Similarly, in NAMUDNO, described fully in Part II below, the 
Court relied heavily upon the avoidance canon to reach its surprising 
interpretation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 
 Finally, though the word “avoidance” does not appear in the opinions, the 
avoidance canon was in play the Supreme Court’s most prominent race case of 
the October 2008 term, Ricci v DeStefano.65 In the so-called “New Haven 
firefighters case,” the Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did 
                                                                                                    
58 128 S Ct at 2271-72. 
59 Id at 2271.   
60 Id at 2274. 
61 129 S Ct 1231 (2009) (plurality). 
62 The Court set forth the statutory question this way: “In a district that is not a majority-minority 
district, if a racial minority could elect its candidate of choice with support from crossover 
majority voters, can § 2 require the district to be drawn to accommodate this potential?” Id at 
1238. 
63 Id at 1247 (internal quotations omitted).  
64 Id at 1248.  Though not phrased in explicit avoidance terms, the issue arose in Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion involving a controversial Texas re-redistricting plan.  LULAC v Perry, 548 US 
399,446 (2006) (Kennedy) (plurality) (“Accordingly, the ability to aid in Frost’s election does not 
make the old District 24 an African-American opportunity district for purposes of § 2. If § 2 were 
interpreted to protect this kind of influence, it would unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every 
redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions.”). 
65 129 S Ct 2658 (2009). 
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not allow the city to throw out the result of a test used to identify firefighters for 
promotion, after the test showed white candidates outperformed minority 
candidates.  Plaintiffs claimed that throwing out the test results violated both Title 
VII and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution.  The Supreme Court declined to reach the constitutional question, 
citing a 1984 voting rights case, Escambia County, stating that “normally the 
Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon 
which to dispose of the case.”66  The Court then applied a new test for judging 
Title VII claims,67 thereby avoiding the constitutional question.  The Ricci 
opinion noted two more times that “we need not decide” the constitutional 
question in this case.68  
In his Ricci concurrence, Justice Scalia noted the tension between Title 
VII’s requirements for race-conscious employment decisions and his view of the 
Equal Protection Clause. “The Court’s resolution of these cases makes it 
unnecessary to resolve these matters today. But the war between disparate impact 
and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin 




NAMUDNO AND CITIZENS UNITED:  
AVOIDANCE AND ANTI-AVOIDANCE 
 
 Against the backdrop set forth in Part I, I now consider in detail how 
unusual the Court’s actions in NAMUDNO and Citizens United actually were 




 In 1965, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act.70
 
Section 5 of the VRA 
requires that “covered jurisdictions” obtain preclearance from the federal 
                                                                                                    
66 Id, citing Escambia County v McMillan, 466 US 48, 52 (1984) (per curiam).  Escambia County 
was an interesting case because “[t]he parties did not brief or argue the statutory question on 
appeal.  The Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded the matter to the appellate court, 
instructing the court to consider first whether it could affirm the district court based solely on the 
Voting Rights Act.”  Kloppenberg, 35 BC L Rev at 1029 (cited in note 35). 
67 Linda Greenhouse, Who Called Off the Charge?, “The Breakfast Table,” Slate, June 29, 2009, 
online at http://www.slate.com/id/2220927/entry/2221819/ (visited Sept. 1, 2009). 
68 Ricci, 129 S Ct at 2664, 2676. 
69 Id at 2683 (Scalia concurring). 
70 42 USC §§ 1973–1973p (2004).   
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government before making any changes in voting practices or procedures,71 for 
changes as major as a 10-year redistricting plan or as minor as moving a polling 
place across the street.
 
For each one, the covered jurisdiction must demonstrate 
that the change was made without a discriminatory purpose and that it will not 
make the affected minority groups worse off.  Section 5’s aim was to prevent state 
and local governments with a history of discrimination against racial minorities 
from changing their voting rules without first proving that such changes would 
have neither a discriminatory purpose nor effect. 
 Some southern states immediately challenged parts of the VRA as 
exceeding congressional power. In the first of these cases, South Carolina v 
Katzenbach, South Carolina challenged core provisions of the Act, including the 
preclearance provision.72 The Court rejected South Carolina’s argument that the 
challenged provisions “exceed[ed] the powers of Congress and encroach[ed] on 
an area reserved to the States by the Constitution.”73 It held that Congress had 
acted appropriately under its powers granted in Section Two of the Fifteenth 
Amendment.74 In so holding, the Court gave considerable deference to 
congressional determinations about the means necessary to “enforce” the 
Fifteenth Amendment. 
 Over the years, Congress continued to renew Section 5, adding in 
additional coverage areas.  In 1982, Congress renewed the provision for a 25-year 
period, expiring in 2007.  The City of Rome, Georgia challenged the renewed 
preclearance provision and the Court again rejected the challenge.75  Then-Justice 
Rehnquist dissented, raising federalism concerns.76   
 In the years since City of Rome, the Supreme Court underwent a 
federalism revolution, narrowing Congressional power over the states. Beginning 
with City of Boerne v Flores,77 the Court has limited Congress to passing 
“remedial” statutes. It has rejected congressional attempts to expand the scope of 
constitutional rights through legislation beyond that which is “congruen[t] and 
proportional[]”78 to remedy intentional unconstitutional discrimination by the 
states. In Board of Trustees v Garrett,79 the Court indicated that it will search for 
an adequate evidentiary record to support a congressional determination that 
                                                                                                    
71 Id at § 1973c. 
72 South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 307 (1966).   
73 Id at 323. 
74 Id at 337. 
75 City of Rome v United States, 446 US 156, 187 (1980).   
76 Id at 210-15 (Rehnquist dissenting). 
77 521 US 507, 519 (1997).   
78 Id at 520. 
79 531 US 356, 373 n.8 (2001).   
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1436669




states are engaging in sufficient intentionally unconstitutional conduct so as to 
justify congressional regulation. 
 Because of these new standards, many election law scholars worried that 
unless Congress made changes to the existing section 5 regime, a renewed section 
5 could be struck down as unconstitutional.80  Though Congress did make some 
changes to section 5 when it renewed the Act in 2006, such as rejecting an earlier 
Supreme Court interpretation of the applicable section 5 standard in Georgia v 
Ashcroft,81 it did not make changes to two key provisions of the Act which would 
have updated the Act to account for changed political realties.  First, Congress did 
not change the coverage formula for which jurisdictions must engage in 
preclearance.  That formula used data from the 1964, 1968, or 1972 elections.82  
Second, Congress did not consider ways to make it easier for jurisdictions that 
have been covered to “bail out” from coverage under the Act, such as by putting 
the onus on the federal government to prepare a list of jurisdictions presumptively 
entitled to bail out because of their good record on voting and race.83  These were 
politically sensitive subjects, and it appears that Congress did not have any 
political incentive in taking a close look at these difficult race and politics 
questions84 before reauthorizing section 5 for another 25 years by a wide 
margin.85 
                                                                                                    
80 Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act after Tennessee v. Lane, 66 Ohio St L J L.J. 177 (2005); Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 Colum L Rev 1710 (2005), The 
Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearing before the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (2006) (statement of Richard H. Pildes).  See generally The 
Future of the Voting Rights Act (David Epstein et al., eds., Russell Sage Foundation 2008).  
81 Georgia v Ashcroft, 549 US 461 (2003).  See 42 USCA § 1973c(b) (West Supp. 2007).  For an 
exhaustive look at how the renewed section 5 deals with the Georgia v. Ashcroft precedent, see 
Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 Yale L J 174 
(2007). 
82 42 USCA § 1973c(a). 
83 See Richard Hasen, Pass the VRA Bailout Amendment, Roll Call, July 11, 2006, online at 
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/bailout.pdf (visited Sept 1, 2009).  
84 Persily, 117 Yale L J 174 (cited in note 81); Richard H. Pildes, Political Avoidance, 
Constitutional Theory, and the VRA, 117 Yale L J Pocket Pt 148 (2007), online at 
http://thepocketpart.org/2007/12/10/pildes.html (visited Sept 1, 2009). 
85 Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v Mukasey, 573 F Supp 2d 221, 229 
(D.D.C. 2008) (three-judge court) (“in July 2006 Congress extended section 5 for an additional 
twenty-five years. Entitled the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting 
Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, the statute, which passed 
overwhelmingly in both chambers (unanimously in the Senate and by 390–33 in the House), 
overruled several Supreme Court decisions interpreting section 5’s substantive test, but otherwise 
left the law virtually unchanged. 2006 Amendments, 120 Stat. at 577. President George W. Bush 
signed the bill into law on July 27, 2006.”). 
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 Soon after Congress passed the renewed section 5, the Project on Fair 
Representation, a group ideologically opposed to section 5 as impermissible race-
based legislation, backed litigation to challenge section 5 as exceeding 
congressional power under the Fifteenth Amendment.86  As obscure Austin utility 
district, the Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One, brought the 
challenge, which was initially heard by a three-judge federal district court in 
Washington D.C.  Though its main argument was against the continued 
constitutionality of the preclearance provision of section 5, the utility district also 
argued it should be entitled to bail out from coverage under the Act as a “political 
subdivision” covered by section 5. 
 The three-judge court in NAMUDNO v Mukasey, in an exhaustive and 
unanimous opinion, rejected both arguments.87  The court spent 5 pages 
addressing the bailout question, and then 48 pages addressing the thorny 
constitutional question (with the remainder of the opinion consisting of maps and 
appendices).  For purposes of this Article, I examine only the bailout analysis.  
 In addressing the argument of the utility district that it should be allowed 
to bail out, the court began by noting that until 1982, section 4(a) of the Act 
“limited bailout to two types of entities (1) covered states, and (2) political 
subdivisions covered ‘as a separate unit.’”88 Section 14(c)(2) of the VRA defines 
“political subdivision”  to “mean any county or parish, except that where 
registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or 
parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of the state which conducts 
registration for voting.”  “As a result, [under the pre-1982 version of section 4(a) 
of the VRA] only political subdivisions separately designated for coverage could 
seek bailout.  So, for example, Texas could seek bailout as a covered state…But 
political subdivisions within covered states—such as Travis County, in which the 
District is located—could not apply for bailout despite meeting the section 
14(c)(2) definition because they had never been separately designated for 
coverage.”89   The court confirmed this understanding of the section 4(a) bailout 
                                                                                                    
86 See Chuck Lindell, Star Lawyer Makes Supreme Court Splash, Austin-American Statesman, 
July 5, 2009,online at  
http://www.statesman.com/news/content/news/stories/local/2009/07/05/0705coleman.html 
(visited Sept 1, 2009) (“When he has a choice of cases, [utility district lawyer Greg] Coleman said 
he looks for pro bono work that fits his philosophy. He took the Voting Rights Act case largely 
for free, with only a ‘five-figure’ contribution for expenses from the Project on Fair 
Representation, an advocacy group that challenges race-based government policies, Coleman 
said.”). 
87 Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v Mukasey, 573 F.Supp.2d 221 
(D.D.C. 2008) (three-judge court). 
88 Id at 230.  Some covered jurisdictions include only parts of states, explaining the second type of 
entity. 
89 Id at 231. 
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provision by citing to the Supreme Court’s City of Rome case, in which the Court 
held that the city of Rome, Georgia “was ineligible to seek bailout because the 
coverage formula of § 4(b) ha[d] never been applied to it.”90 
 “In 1982, however, Congress expanded bailout eligibility to include 
section 14(c)(2) political subdivisions within covered states”91 by adding 
language to section 4(a) allowing bailout by “any political subdivision of such 
State…, though such determinations were not made with respect to such 
subdivision as a separate unit.”92  As the court explained, “[b]y including political 
subdivisions within covered states even though they had not been designated for 
coverage ‘as a separate unit,” Congress made jurisdictions like Travis County 
eligible to seek bailout.”93 
 The utility district in NAMUDNO conceded it did not qualify, like Travis 
County, as a “political subdivision” under section 14(c)(2) because it was not a 
county and it never conducted registration for voting.  The utility district 
nonetheless argued that it constituted a “political subdivision” in the ordinary 
meaning of that term and therefore could bail out.94  In support of the argument, 
the utility district cited to a 1978 Supreme Court case, United States v Board of 
Commissioners of Sheffield Alabama,95 a case in which the Supreme Court held 
that “once a state has been designated for coverage, section 5’s preclearance 
requirement applies to all political units within it regardless of whether the units 
qualify as section 14(c)(2) political subdivisions.”96  The utility district focused 
on dictum in Sheffield stating that “section 14(c)(2)’s definition ‘was intended to 
operate only for purposes of determining which political units in nondesignated 
states may be separately designated for coverage under § 4(b).’”97  The utility 
district argued that when Congress amended the bailout provisions of the VRA, it 
did so “in light of Sheffield’s dictum that the only purpose of section 14(c)(2)’s 
definition is to identify which political subunits qualify for coverage,”98 and 
therefore section 14(c)(2) was no bar to the court holding it should be considered 
a “political subdivision” entitled to seek bailout under section 4(a). 
 The district court rejected this argument on numerous grounds.  First, the 
court offered a textual analysis, stating that the utility district’s definition would 
render the phrase in the amended statute “though [the coverage] determinations 
                                                                                                    
90 Id (citing City of Rome, 446 US at 167). 
91 Id 
92 1982 Amendments § 2(b)(2), 96 Stat. at 131 (codified at 42 USC § 1973b(a)(1)). 
93 Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v Mukasey, 573 F.Supp.2d at 231. 
94 Id. 
95 435 US 110 (1978). 
96 Northwest Austin, 573 F Supp 2d at 232. 
97 Id at 232. 
98 Id. 
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were not made with respect to such subdivision as a separate unit” as 
impermissible surplusage.99  In other words, if Congress intended to allow all 
political subdivisions (and not just section 14(c)(2) subdivisions) to be eligible for 
bailout, it did not need to include that extra clause.  “This language demonstrates 
that Congress intended ‘political subdivision’ to refer only to section 14(c)(2) 
subdivisions—that is, counties, parishes, and voter-registering subunits—since 
only ‘such subdivision[s]’ can be separately designated for coverage.”100 
 The court also pointed to unambiguous statements in House and Senate 
Reports accompanying the 1982 amendments which “clarify that Congress 
intended the expanded bailout mechanism to encompass only section 14(c)(2) 
political subdivisions.”101  For example, the Senate Report states that: 
 
Towns and cities within counties may not bailout separately. This 
is a logistical limit. As a practical matter, if every political 
subdivision were eligible to seek separate bailout, we could not 
expect that the Justice Department or private groups could 
remotely hope to monitor and to defend the bailout suits. It would 
be one thing for the Department and outside civil rights litigators 
to appear in hundreds of bailout suits. It would be quite another for 
them to have to face many thousands of such actions because each 
of the smallest political subunits could separately bail out. Few 
questioned the reasonableness and fairness of this cutoff in the 
House.102 
 
 The district court concluded its discussion by noting that the Attorney 
General issued a regulation confirming that only section 14(c)(2) jurisdictions 
may seek bailout, and that the Supreme Court has traditionally afforded 
substantial deference to the Attorney General’s interpretation of section 5.103  The 
court also noted that Congress was silent in 2006 when it reauthorized the Voting 
Rights Act in light of the practice of bailout by eleven Virginia political 
subdivisions that relied upon the Attorney General’s interpretation.104  Congress 
did so despite the fact that two witnesses unsuccessfully urged Congress “to 
                                                                                                    
99 Id.   
100 Id. 
101 Id at 232-33. 
102 Id at 233 (citing S. Rep. No. 97-417 at 57 n. 192, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 
235 no. 192). 
103 Id. 
104 Id at 233-34. 
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expand bailout eligibility to encompass governmental units smaller than counties 
and parishes.”105 
 “Given this extensive evidence of clear legislative intent—both textual 
and historical—we need say little about Sheffield.”106 The court dismissed the 
Sheffield statement as dicta, and concluded that “[i]n any event, even if, as 
Sheffield’s dictum suggests, section 14(c)(2)’s definition originally operated only 
to identify entities eligible for coverage, the amended section 4(a)’s text and 
legislative history make clear that Congress used that definition in 1982 for an 
additional purpose: to identify those entitles eligible to seek bailout.”107 
 In light of the statutory tour de force of the district court, voting rights 
experts believed that the statutory bailout argument had no chance when 
NAMUDNO was appealed to the Supreme Court.108 Instead, it seemed 
unavoidable that the Court would address the constitutionality of the renewed 
section 5.   
 At oral argument, Justice Souter pushed the bailout argument,109 but the 
conservative members of the Court, led by the Chief Justice, focused instead on 
the constitutional questions and severely criticized section 5.110  In addition to 
                                                                                                    
105 Id at 234.   
106 Id at 234. 
107 Id.  The court also rejected the utility district’s arguments that it should rely on Texas law’s 
definition of political subdivision, and that accepting the government’s definition of political 
subdivision for section 5 purposes would interfere with application of section 2 of the Act. 
108 See Heather Gerken, The Supreme Court Punts on Section 5, Balkinization, June 22, 2009, 
online at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/supreme-court-punts-on-section-5.html (visited Sept 
1, 2009) (“the statutory argument is one that that almost no one (save Greg Coleman, the lawyer 
who argued the case and who is now entitled to be described as a mad genius) thought was 
particularly tenable because of prior Court opinions.”); Richard L. Hasen, Sordid Business: Will 
the Supreme Court Kill the Voting Rights Act?, Slate, Apr. 27, 2009, online at 
http://www.slate.com/id/2216888/ (“Since there’s no good statutory loophole, the larger 
constitutional question seems unavoidable.”). 
109 Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v Holder, Oral Argument Transcript, 
Apr. 29, 2009, at 14, online at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-322.pdf (visited Sept 1, 
2009) (“Well Mr. Coleman, this is important to me. Do you — do you acknowledge that if we 
find on your favor on the bailout point we need not reach the constitutional point?”). 
110 Justice Ginsburg also offered some cogent criticisms of the statutory bailout argument, along 
the lines of the district court’s analysis of the issue.  See for example id at 4 (“And what do you do 
with a statute that has three categories — the State, political subdivision, and then there’s 
‘governmental unit’? The district qualifies as a governmental unit. Why would Congress add that 
third category if the district came within ‘political subdivision’?”); id at 4-5 (“the statute does use 
the term ‘governmental unit’ to encompass districts. And if they were also subdivisions, why 
would Congress need to add an additional category?”); id at 8 (“There was a proposal [in 2006], 
was there not, to allow governmental units to bail out — to allow anyone who was required to 
preclear to bail out?”); id at 9 (“The Department of Justice has — does it — does it not have a 
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asking Debo Agebile, counsel for the NAACP whether “it your position that 
today southerners are more likely to discriminate than northerners,”111 the Chief 
Justice remarked: “Counsel, … our decision in City of Boerne said that action 
under section 5 has to be congruent and proportional to what it’s trying to 
remedy. Here, as I understand it, one-twentieth of 1 percent of the submissions 
are not precleared. That, to me, suggests that they are sweeping far more broadly 
than they need to, to address the intentional discrimination under the Fifteenth 
Amendment.”112  Once Justice Kennedy weighed in repeatedly with questions 
about whether preclearance undermined the sovereignty and dignity of the 
covered states,113 most Court watchers predicted a 5-4 decision striking down 
section 5 of the Act on constitutional grounds.114 
 In a surprising and relatively short opinion, however, the Court on an 8-1 
vote decided NAMUDNO on statutory grounds, ruling that the utility district was 
entitled to bail out.115  Justice Thomas, speaking only for himself, would have 
held section 5 unconstitutional.116   
 The Court’s opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts, begins by stating 
the avoidance canon in an interesting way that fails to mention the need for a 
plausible interpretation of a statute to avoid deciding constitutional questions.117  
“Our usual practice is to avoid the unnecessary resolution of constitutional 
questions.”118  After 5 pages of background, the Court turned to give a detailed 
explanation of the serious constitutional questions raised by the case.  The court 
noted that the “Act … differentiates between the States, despite our historic 
tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’”119  It said a departure from 
this principle “requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is 
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”120  It flagged the federalism 
                                                                                                                                     
regulation that contradicts your reading? And hasn’t that been out there  wasn’t it out there before 
the 2006 extension?”). Justice Ginsburg must have swallowed hard before signing the opinion of 
the Court. 
111 Id at 48. 
112 Id at 27. 
113 See for example id at 34 (statement of Justice Kennedy) (“Congress has made a finding that the 
sovereignty of Georgia is less than the sovereign dignity of Ohio.”). 
114 Adam Liptak, Skepticism at Court on Validity of Vote Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, online 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/30/us/30voting.html (visited Sept. 1, 2009) (“A central 
provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, designed to protect minorities in states with a history 
of discrimination, is at substantial risk of being struck down as unconstitutional, judging from the 
questioning on Wednesday at the Supreme Court.”). 
115 Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v Holder, 129 S Ct 2504 (2009). 
116 Id at 2517 (Thomas concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
117 See above Part I.B. 
118 NAMUDNO, 129 S Ct at 2508. 
119 Id at 2512. 
120 Id. 
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concerns and noted the danger that “[t]he evil that §5 is meant to address may no 
longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.”121  After 
noting that the coverage formula is 35 years old and possibly outdated, the Court 
noted that “Congress heard warnings from supporters of extending § 5 that 
evidence in the record did not address” differences between covered and non-
covered states.122   
 Following this discussion raising serious doubts about section 5’s 
constitutionality, the opinion stated that “we are keenly mindful of our 
institutional role. We fully appreciate that judging the Constitutionality of an Act 
of Congress is the ‘gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called upon to 
perform.’”123  Then, as in Ricci,124 the Court cited Escambia County for the 
proposition that the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some 
other ground to dispose of the case.125  Again, there was no mention of the need 
for a plausible interpretation of the statute. 
 The Court then offered a superficial textual analysis of the bailout 
question.  The Court did not discuss the textual analysis offered by the district 
court.  Nor did it quote from and examine the legislative history showing 
Congress’s unambiguous intent to limit bailout to states and political subdivisions 
that register voters. The Court also ignored the Department of Justice’s 
regulations stating that only jurisdictions that register voters may bail out, and 
refused to afford any deference to such regulations. 
 Instead, the Court began by conceding that if section 4(a) were considered 
in isolation, “the District Court’s approach might well be correct.  But here, 
specific precedent, the structure of the Voting Rights Act, and the underlying 
constitutional concerns compel a broader reading of the statute.”126  The Court 
                                                                                                    
121 Id. 
122 Id. The Court then noted that it was an open question whether the congruence and 
proportionality standard or an easier rational basis review might apply to the constitutional 
question.  Id. 
123 Id at 2512-13 (quoting Blodgett v Holden, 275 US 142, 147-148 (1927) (Holmes concurring)). 
124 See note 65 above. 
125 The majority and Justice Thomas then debated whether a finding on bailout for the utility 
district would dispose of the case.  Citing a concession by the utility district, the majority 
concluded it would do so.  See NAMUDNO, 129 S Ct at 2513; see also id at 2517-18 (Thomas 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
126 Id at 2513.  The Court began the section with the statement that “‘Statutory definitions control 
the meaning of statutory words, of course, in the usual case. But this is an unusual case.’ Lawson 
v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201, 69 S.Ct. 503, 93 L.Ed. 611 (1949); see also 
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 764, 69 S.Ct. 1274, 93 L.Ed. 1672 
(1949); Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406, 412, 103 S.Ct. 2476, 76 L.Ed.2d 678 
(1983).”  But those cases involved statutory readings that went against the main purposes of the 
statute, in a way that the interpretation of the bailout provision did not.  In Lawson, the Court 
refused to construe a provision in a statute governing disability payments in a way that would 
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then relied upon the dicta in Sheffield,127 and stated that the Court confirmed that 
dicta in another 1978 case.128   The Court then appeared to concede that these 
dicta went against the Court’s later City of Rome holding,129 which seemed to 
foreclose the utility district’s argument that it could bail out as a “political 
subdivision.”  But the Court then came up with this deus ex machina: 
 
In 1982, however, Congress expressly repudiated City of Rome 
and instead embraced “piecemeal” bailout. As part of an overhaul 
of the bailout provision, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act 
to expressly provide that bailout was also available to “political 
subdivisions” in a covered State, “though [coverage] 
determinations were not made with respect to such subdivision as a 
separate unit.” Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 96 Stat. 
131, codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1973b(a)(1) (emphasis added). In 
other words, Congress decided that a jurisdiction covered because 
it was within a covered State need not remain covered for as long 
as the State did. If the subdivision met the bailout requirements, it 
could bail out, even if the State could not. In light of these 
amendments, our logic for denying bailout in City of Rome is no 
longer applicable to the Voting Rights Act—if anything, that logic 
compels the opposite conclusion. 
  
This paragraph is not at all supportable by the text of the statute or the 
legislative history.130  There was no “express repudiation” of City of Rome in the 
                                                                                                                                     
“create obvious incongruities in the language, and would destroy one of the major purposes of the 
second injury provision: the prevention of employer discrimination against handicapped workers. 
We have concluded that Congress would not have intended such a result.”  In McComb, the Court 
looked to legislative history to confirm the meaning of the statute.  In Shacket, the Court refused 
to construe a statute to “defeat the purpose of the legislation.” 
127 See  notes 95-106 above. 
128 NAMUDNO, 129 S Ct at 2514 (citing Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v White, 439 US 32 
(1978)). 
129 Id at 2515 (“Even if that is what City of Rome held…). 
130 The Court ended its brief analysis by setting up a strawman argument: “The Government 
contends that this reading of Sheffield is mistaken, and that the district is subject to § 5 under our 
decision in Sheffield not because it is a ‘political subdivision’ but because it is a ‘State.’ That 
would mean it could bail out only if the whole State could bail out.”  Id at 2516.  But that is not 
what the government argued.  Instead, the government offered the following reading of Sheffield: 
“Sheffield held that, in light of the statutory structure and purposes, ‘§ 5’s preclearance 
requirement for electoral changes by a covered ‘State’ reached all such changes made by political 
units in that State.” Ibid.; see Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 127 (‘[T]he reference to ‘State’ in § 5 includes 
political units within it.’).” Brief for Appellees at 13, online at 
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/08-322_AppelleeFederal.pdf (visited 
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text of the 1982 renewal.  Indeed, City of Rome is not mentioned in the Senate 
Report as being repudiated.131  Congress is not shy about mentioning statutory 
Supreme Court precedent it is overturning:  The 1982 Senate Report is full of 
references to overturning City of Mobile v Bolden,132 and the 2006 text of the 
VRA renewal itself (not to mention the legislative history) is full of references to 
overturning Georgia v Ashcroft.133 The Court pointed to no evidence in the 
legislative materials of an express repudiation of City of Rome. 
 Nor was there any implicit repudiation of City of Rome.  As illustrated by 
the district court opinion, all of the legislative history—ignored by the Court—
points in the exact contrary direction to the analysis of the Court.  It could not 
have been clearer when both the House and Senate Report accompanying the 
1982 VRA is that the “standard for bail-out is broadened to permit political 
subdivisions, as defined in Section 14(c)(2), in covered states to seek bailout 
although the state itself may remain covered.”134  The Supreme Court’s 
interpretation also went against the accepted understanding of the Act, as codified 
in the Attorney General’s regulations. 
 Perhaps what is most remarkable about this statutory interpretation is the 
conspiracy of silence on the Court.  No Justice, not even Justice Thomas in his 
partial dissent, objected to this analysis, which mangled Congress’s statutory 
intent.  Justice Thomas’s only comment on the bailout point was to take the 
position that granting the utility district the chance to apply for bailout did not 
grant it the relief it sought in its complaint.135 
 
B. Citizens United136 
 
 In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(“BCRA,” more commonly referred to as “McCain-Feingold”).137  This was the 
most significant federal campaign finance law since the 1974 amendments to the 
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), whose constitutionality the Supreme 
                                                                                                                                     
Sept 1, 2009). In other words, the government argued that Sheffield itself read the term “State” to 
include political units within it; it did not argue that the utility district is a state. 
131 Rick Hasen, The Scalia Enigma in NAMUDNO, Election Law Blog, Jun. 23, 2009, online at 
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013921.html (visited Sept 1, 2009). 
132 See Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30 (1986) (recounting in detail Congress’s amendment of 
section 2 of the VRA to account for the Supreme Court’s City of Mobile holding). 
133 See note 32 above (discussing Georgia v Ashcroft “fix”). 
134 Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v Mukasey, 573 F Supp 2d at 232-33 
(citing House and Senate reports). 
135 NAMUDNO, 129 S Ct at 2517-18 (Thomas concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
136 The next few paragraphs are drawn from Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts 
Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v Wisconsin Right to Life, 94 Minn L Rev 1064 (2008). 
137 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 101, 2 USC § 441i(a) (Supp. V 2007). 
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Court considered in Buckley v Valeo.138  Although BCRA made many changes in 
the law, the changes most relevant for purposes of understanding this case 
concern BCRA’s “electioneering communications” provisions. 
 FECA (continuing a law predating FECA) bars corporations and unions 
from spending general treasury funds on certain election-related activities.139  
FECA allowed corporations and unions instead to set up separate political 
committees (commonly referred to as PACs) to spend money on these campaigns, 
but it limited both the amount that could be contributed and who could be 
solicited to contribute to these PACs. 
 By the 1990s, many people viewed the FECA as ineffective, thanks to an 
interpretation of the statute by the Court in Buckley.140  The Buckley Court held 
that, to avoid vagueness and overbreadth problems within FECA, its provisions 
should be interpreted to reach only election-related activity containing “express 
advocacy,” such as “Vote for Smith.”141  Individuals, corporations, and unions 
began running “issue ads” that appeared aimed at influencing federal elections but 
that escaped FECA regulation through an avoidance of words of express 
advocacy.  Thus, individuals and entities that spent money on “Vote against 
Jones” ads had to disclose the sources of payment and those ads could not be paid 
for with corporate or union treasury funds.  In contrast, there were no such 
limitations on ads that appeared intended to influence federal elections but that 
avoided the magic words of “express advocacy,” such as an ad which said “Call 
Senator Jones and tell her what you think of her lousy vote on the stimulus bill.”  
Spending on such ads increased dramatically in the 1990s.142 
 BCRA sought to close this issue advocacy “loophole” by creating new 
“electioneering communications” provisions.  Electioneering communications are 
television or radio (not print or Internet) advertisements that feature a candidate 
for federal election and are capable of reaching 50,000 people in the relevant 
electorate 30 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election.   Anyone 
making electioneering communications over a certain dollar threshold must 
disclose contributions funding the ads and spending related to the ads to the FEC 
(BCRA § 201).143 Corporations and unions cannot spend general treasury funds 
on such ads (but could pay for the ads through their PACs) (BCRA § 203).144  In 
addition, anyone broadcasting an electioneering communication must state in the 
                                                                                                    
138 424 US 1 (1976). 
139 2 USC § 441b. 
140 See McConnell v FEC, 540 US 93, 126 (2003). 
141 Buckley, 424 US at 44 n.51. 
142 See McConnell v FEC, 540 US at 126-27. 
143 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 201, 2 USC § 434(f)(1) (Supp. V 2007). 
144 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 203, 2 U.S.C § 441b(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. V 
2007). 
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ad the person or committee funding the ad and whether it is authorized by any 
candidate (BCRA § 311).145  
 The § 203 spending limit does not apply to nonprofit corporations that 
meet certain requirements, including that the nonprofit has a policy not to take 
for-profit corporate or union funding.146  These groups are referred to as MCFL 
groups (named after a 1986 Supreme Court case, FEC v Massachusetts Citizens 
for Life147), and they still must comply with the disclosure provisions in BCRA § 
201 and § 311.   
 A broad coalition of plaintiffs challenged each of these BCRA provisions 
(along with a number of others) in McConnell v FEC.148  By a 5-4 vote, the 
Supreme Court upheld BCRA § 203 against facial challenge.  It reaffirmed the 
Court’s controversial holding in Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce.149 
Austin held that corporate spending on elections could be limited because of what 
the Court termed the “distorting and corrosive effects” of immense aggregations 
of wealth accomplished with the corporate form, which could be spent on 
elections despite the corporation’s ideas having little or no public support.150  
Relying on Austin’s upholding of corporate limits on “express advocacy,” the 
McConnell Court held that the “issue ads” regulated by the electioneering 
communications provisions of BCRA could constitutionally be limited because 
most of them were the “functional equivalent of express advocacy.”151    
 In Wisconsin Right to Life v Federal Election Commission (WRTL I),152 
the Court held that McConnell did not preclude an “as applied” challenge to 
BCRA § 203 for a corporation or union whose ads were not the “functional 
equivalent of express advocacy.”  WRTL I involved a corporate-funded broadcast 
advertising that mentioned Senator Feingold’s and Senator Kohl’s position on 
judicial filibusters, and was to be broadcast in Wisconsin during the period of 
Senator Feingold’s reelection campaign.  After remand, in which the lower court 
found the ads were not entitled to an exemption because they were the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy, the case returned to the Supreme Court.153   
                                                                                                    
145 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 311. 
146 McConnell, 540 US at 210-11. 
147 479 US 238 (1986). 
148 540 US 93 (2003). 
149 494 US 652 (1990). 
150 Id at 660. 
151 McConnell, 540 US at 206.  By an 8-1 vote, the Court also upheld BCRA § 201 and § 311 
against facial challenge.   
152 546 US 410 (2006). 
153 See Hasen, 94 Minn L Rev at 1076-77 (cited in note 136). 
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 In Wisconsin Right to Life v Federal Election Commission, (WRTL II),154 
the Court held, on a 5-4 vote, that BCRA § 203 could not be constitutionally 
applied to such ads.  Three Justices in the majority (Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and 
Thomas) held, consistent with their dissenting opinions in McConnell, that BCRA 
§ 203 was unconstitutional as applied to any corporate advertising, stating that 
McConnell and Austin should be overruled.155  Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito, in a narrower controlling opinion, did not reach the question whether 
McConnell and Austin should be overruled.  They held instead that the only 
corporate-funded advertisements that BCRA could bar constitutionally were those 
that were the “functional equivalent of express advocacy.”156   
 The controlling opinion held that in making the “functional equivalent” 
determination, the question the FEC or a court must consider is whether, without 
regard to context (such as the fact that the filibuster issue was one that 
conservatives were using to attack liberal Democrats) and without detailed 
discovery of the intentions of the advertisers, the advertisement was susceptible of 
no reasonable interpretation other than as an advertisement supporting or 
opposing a candidate for office.157  Unless the ad was susceptible to “no 
reasonable interpretation” other than as an advertisement supporting or opposing 
the candidate, it would be unconstitutional to apply BCRA § 203 to bar corporate 
funding for it.  The controlling opinion then held that the ad at issue in WRTL II 
was susceptible to an interpretation as something other than an ad against Senator 
Feingold: it did not mention Senator Feingold’s character or fitness for office, and 
had no other clear indicia of the functional equivalent of express advocacy.  
Accordingly, WRTL was entitled to an as-applied exemption and could pay for 
the ads with corporate funds.158 
 Citizens United is a follow-on case to WRTL II.159 Citizens United, a 
nonprofit ideological corporation (but one that took some for-profit corporate 
funding) produced a feature-length documentary entitled Hillary: The Movie.  
The documentary appeared in theaters and was available to order via DVD during 
the 2008 primary season.  Citizens United wished to distribute the movie as well 
through a cable television “video-on-demand” service.  In exchange for a $1.2 
million fee, a cable television operator consortium would have made the 
documentary available to be downloaded by cable subscribers for free “on 
demand” as part of an “Election 08” series.  The documentary contained no 
express advocacy, but it did contain a great deal of negative statements about 
                                                                                                    
154 127 S Ct 2652 (2007). 
155 See id at 2674-87 (Scalia, J concurring). 
156 Id at 2658-74 (principal opinion). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 The facts appear in Citizens United v FEC, 530 F Supp 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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Hillary Clinton, including statements that she was a “European socialist” and not 
fit to be Commander-in-Chief.  The FEC took the position that the documentary 
was the functional equivalent of express advocacy and therefore subject to BCRA 
§ 203, meaning it was an electioneering communication that could not be paid for 
with corporate funds.160  
 Pursuant to a special jurisdictional provision of BCRA,161 Citizens United 
filed suit against the FEC before a three-judge United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia (with direct appeal to the Supreme Court).  Citizens United 
moved for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of BCRA § 203 for its 
broadcast of the documentary through “video-on-demand.”162  
 The three-judge court unanimously rejected Citizens United’s 
arguments.163  The court held that under WRTL II the documentary was the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy and was therefore not entitled to an as-
applied exemption: the movie could not be paid for with for-profit corporate 
funds.164  Citizens United appealed from the denial of the preliminary injunction 
to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal.165  The case returned to the 
district court, which then granted summary judgment, relying on its earlier 
opinion on the preliminary injunction.166   
 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for 
argument.167  On appeal, Citizens United raised a number of arguments against 
the government’s position that this documentary could not be broadcast over 
cable television’s “video-on-demand” service because it constituted a corporate-
funded “electioneering communication.”  Some of the arguments were statutory; 
                                                                                                    
160 Citizens United also wished to broadcast some 10-second and 30-second advertisements 
promoting the documentary.  The corporation wished to do so without complying with BCRA § 
201 (requiring disclosure of funders) or § 311 (requiring the “disclaimer” stating who paid for the 
advertisement and that it was not approved by any candidate or committee).  The FEC conceded 
that the advertisements (as opposed to the documentary itself) were not the “functional equivalent 
of express advocacy,” but it took the position that the rules of BCRA § 201 and § 203 still 
applied.   According to the FEC, the disclosure rules were not eligible for the “as applied” 
exemption that the Court created for corporate spending in WRTL II. Citizens United, 530 F Supp 
2d 274. 
161 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 403, 2 USC § 437(h) (2000 & Supp. V 2007); 28 
USC § 2284 (2000). 
162 It also sought to bar enforcement of BCRA § 201 and § 311 disclosure requirements as to the 
advertisements.   
163 Citizens United v FEC, 530 F Supp 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (three-judge court). 
164 As to the advertisements, the district court held that the WRTL II exemption did not apply to 
the disclosure rules, relying on language in McConnell broadly upholding these requirements.  Id. 
165 128 S Ct 1732 (2008).    
166 2008 WL 2788753 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008).   
167 129 S Ct 594 (2008)  
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others were constitutional.168 Its narrowest argument is that that the FEC 
regulations should not be construed to apply to “video-on-demand” cable 
broadcasts.169  Simply put, the Court can hold that video-on-demand, which 
requires a cable subscriber to choose to download video for viewing, is not a 
“broadcast, cable or satellite communication that refers to a candidate for federal 
office”170 as defined by BCRA. 
Citizens United concedes that it did not make this argument below, but it 
notes that the district court passed on it and that the canon of constitutional 
avoidance gives the Court a reason to address this statutory question.171  Citizens 
United’s broadest argument in its merits brief is that Austin was wrongly decided 
and should be overruled; then even express advocacy by corporations in federal 
elections could be paid for with corporate treasury funds.172  But as to the Austin 
argument, the FEC notes that Citizens United did not raise this point below, 
either, and that Citizens United expressly abandoned any facial challenges in the 
district court.173  The issue also was not raised in Citizen United’s jurisdictional 
                                                                                                    
168 Among the arguments raised is that the Court should expand the MCFL exemption for 
nonprofit corporations that take some for-profit funds, and that its documentary was not the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy. 
169 Citizens United v FEC, Brief for Appellants at 27 n.2, online at 
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/08-205_Appellant.pdf (visited Sept 1, 
2009). 
170 2 USC § 434(f)(3)(A) (Supp. V 2007). 
171 Id.  The government disagrees that the Court should reach the question, Brief for Appellee at 
24 n. 7, online at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/08-205_Appellee.pdf 
(visited Sept 1, 2009), but the BCRA legislative sponsors (Sens. McCain and Feingold, and 
former Representatives Shays and Meehan) filed an amicus brief suggesting that if the Court is 
otherwise inclined to find for Citizens United in this case, it should do it on grounds that the 
FEC’s implementing regulations did not clearly apply to “video-on-demand” broadcasts.  Brief 
Amici Curiae of Senators McCain and Feingold, and Former Representatives Shays and Meehan, 
online at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/08-
205_AppelleAmCuMcCain.pdf, at 18-19 (visited Sept 1, 2009) (“To the extent that there may be 
some ambiguity in the applicability of the regulations, the Court could possibly conclude that it is 
sufficiently doubtful that on-demand viewing of Hillary: The Movie would have been within the 
scope of the FEC’s current regulations that the Court should withhold judgment on the 
constitutional issue until such time as the FEC made a more specific regulatory determination to 
include such transmissions within the regulatory definition of electioneering communications. In 
no event, however, should the Court accept Citizens United’s broad constitutional arguments that 
would place even express advocacy beyond the bounds of regulation if it is accessed at the choice 
of the viewer.”). 
172 Citizens United v FEC, Brief for Appellants, at 30 (cited in note 169) (“Austin was wrongly 
decided and should be overruled”). 
173 Citizens United v FEC, Tr. oral arg., Mar. 24, 2009, at 27-28, online at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-205.pdf (visited Sept 1, 
2009). 
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statement, and the usual Court rule is that the Court will not consider issues not 
fairly raised therein.174 
 The case was argued in March 2009, and media accounts suggest that the 
government’s case seemed threatened when the Deputy Solicitor General had 
trouble answering a hypothetical question about the regulation of books 
containing “the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”175  Still, it was 
somewhat of a surprise when, on the last regular day of the Court’s term in June 
2009, the Court announced it would rehear the case in September.  More 
surprising, the Court asked for supplemental briefing on the following question:  
“For the proper disposition of this case, should the Court overrule either or both 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and the part of 
McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), which addresses the 
facial validity of Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 
U.S.C. §441b?”176  If the Court were going to decide the case on narrow statutory 
grounds, such as a ruling that video-on-demand is not properly classified as an 
electioneering communication, reargument on the constitutional question would 
be unnecessary.177  The order indicates a Court that is at least seriously 
considering the question. 
 
C. NAMUDNO, Citizen United, and the Supreme Court’s Usual Approach to 
Constitutional Avoidance 
  
 Neither NAMUDNO nor Citizens United fits comfortably in the Supreme 
Court’s usual approach to the constitutional avoidance doctrine.  NAMUDNO 
does not fit because the Court adopted an implausible interpretation of the statute. 
Indeed, the Court’s statutory interpretation analysis was so weak that the Court 
failed even to respond to the contrary statutory points raised by the government 
and offered in detail by the district court.  It is probably no surprise that in stating 
the avoidance principle in NAMUDNO, the Court did not cite the usual 
formulation of the rule requiring a plausible statutory interpretation.  Instead, the 
Court stated more flatly that “[o]ur usual practice is to avoid the unnecessary 
                                                                                                    
174 Citizens United v FEC, Brief for Appellee, at 33-34 (cited in note 170). 
175 Adam Liptak, Justices Consider Interplay Between First Amendment and Campaign Finance 
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2009, online at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/25/washington/25scotus.html (visited Sept 1, 2009); Dahlia 
Lithwick, The Supreme Court Reviews Hillary: The Movie, Slate, Mar. 24, 2009, online at 
http://www.slate.com/id/2214514/ (visited Sept 1, 2009). 
176 Citizens United v FEC, Order, 129 S Ct 2893 (2009).  
177 See Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court Gets Ready to Turn on the Fundraising Spigot, 
Slate, Jun. 29, 2009, online at http://www.slate.com/id/2221753/ (visited Sept 1, 2009). 
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resolution of constitutional questions.”178 The Court then stated that “judging the 
Constitutionality of an Act of Congress is the ‘gravest and most delicate duty that 
this Court is called upon to perform.’”179  Finally, the Court cited Escambia 
County for the proposition that the Court will not decide a constitutional question 
if there is some other ground to dispose of the case.180  In practice, the Court 
jettisoned the requirement of a plausible statutory interpretation in NAMUDNO to 
avoid a sensitive and difficult constitutional question. 
 But the Court’s approach was even starker when viewed against the 
Citizens United order the Court issued just one week later.  The Court 
undoubtedly could avoid deciding whether to overrule Austin and McConnell’s 
upholding of spending limits on corporations and unions through a plausible 
interpretation of the electioneering communication statute so as not to apply to 
video-on-demand.  But regardless of how it ultimately decides the case, it 
ratcheted up the importance of the case and the rhetoric through the reargument 
order. 
 Thus, the operative question here is not simply how plausible a statutory 
construction must be before the avoidance canon kicks in,181 but why the Court 
adopted such an inconsistent approach.  If it is true that the “usual practice” is to 
“avoid the unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions” and that it is the 
“gravest and most delicate duty” to review the constitutionality of an Act of 
Congress, why did the Court in Citizens United not conclude, as in NAMUDNO, 
Ricci, and Escambia County, that the Court will not decide the constitutional 
question because there is some other ground to dispose of the case?  Is not 
avoidance especially warranted in a case in which the constitutional issue was 
abandoned in the trial court and not presented in the jurisdictional statement?  
Why did the Court not follow its usual practice in Clark v Martinez, to the effect 
that “[i]f [one of two plausible statutory constructions] would raise a multitude of 
constitutional problems, the other should prevail…”?182 Why did the Court 
instead set up an in-your-face high stakes constitutional showdown on the 




                                                                                                    
178 NAMUDNO, 129 S Ct at 2508. 
179 Id at 2513 
180 See id.  
181 Schauer, 1995 S Ct Rev at 85 (cited in note 34) (“In reality, ‘fairly possible’ is a matter of 
degree, even assuming some interpretations are not fairly possible. Extending ‘no vehicles in the 
park’ to bicycles is more possible--less of a reach-- than extending it to sleds, even though neither 
extension is compelled and neither is prohibited.”). 
182 Clark, 543 US at 380-81. 
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UNDERSTANDING AVOIDANCE AND ANTI-AVOIDANCE 
AT THE ROBERTS COURT 
  
The contrast between the Court’s treatment of NAMUDNO and Citizens 
United is the latest (and especially high profile) illustration of Judge Friendly’s 
observation that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance will be selectively 
employed.183 In the final part of this article, I explore three potential theories to 
explain the differing treatment of the two cases.  With a data set of just these 
cases (plus the few other significant constitutional avoidance decisions of the 
Roberts Court), and with no inside information about the Justices’ thought 
processes, at this point it is impossible to say which of the three theories best 
explains the action of the Court in these two cases.  But I set out these potential 
theories to test against future use of the avoidance canon and the anti-avoidance 
canon by the Roberts Court. 
 
Fruitful dialogue. The fruitful dialogue explanation posits that the Court 
will use constitutional avoidance only when doing so would further a dialogue 
with Congress that has a realistic chance of actually avoiding constitutional 
problems through redrafting.  On this reading, the Voting Rights Act got 
remanded to Congress because Congress may fix the VRA in ways that do not 
violate the Constitution, but the corporate spending limits provision of federal 
campaign finance law perhaps does not deserve remand because the provisions 
are not constitutionally fixable.   
This is the most charitable reading of the Court’s contrasting orders in 
NAMUDNO and Citizens United.  In this view, the Court would not tolerate the 
political avoidance that Congress exhibited during the 2006 Amendment 
process,184 but the Voting Rights Act is just too important to throw away without 
giving Congress a chance to face the problems head on.  In other words, the 
statute is so important that the Court was willing to jettison its usual rules of 
statutory interpretation despite the strong negative views of some members of the 
Court on the underlying constitutional question to give Congress one more chance 
to save the statute.  This at least may have been the view of Justice Kennedy, and 
without his vote the Court would have spoken in a fractured way in this important 
case. 
Campaign finance, in contrast, stands on different footing.  The Court is 
already well on its way to striking down corporate spending limits as a violation 
of the First Amendment.185  Giving Congress a chance to fix BCRA section 203 
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to clarify whether or not video-on-demand counts as an electioneering 
communication is not going to solve the Court’s fundamental problem with the 
Austin rationale for limiting corporate spending.  If Congress cannot limit 
corporate spending even on express advocacy, then it matters little whether 
Congress intended to cover the “functional equivalent of express advocacy” 
contained in a video-on-demand documentary. 
Understood this way, the Court’s decision to make the issue front-and-
center at a second oral argument makes sense.  This anti-avoidance device—
pushing the constitutional question front-and-center—can serve the penumbral 
“fence around the Torah” function of keeping Congress away from even thinking 
of legislating further in a protected area.   
Furthermore, some members of the Court may have thought the 
constitutional issue needed to be addressed given that Citizens United came to the 
Court under its rare mandatory appellate jurisdiction.186  The Court had been 
facing a flurry of mandatory appeals under BCRA, and perhaps it saw that the 
only way to lessen the volume of cases was through a constitutional knock-down 
of BCRA’s foundations. 
 Indeed, even Justices unsure of their constitutional views going into 
Citizens United might have seen a judicial administration benefit to deciding the 
constitutional questions straightforwardly. Addressing constitutional questions 
squarely in the campaign finance area might be especially important given the 
incoherence and fractured nature of the Supreme Court’s existing campaign 
finance jurisprudence.187   Lower courts would certainly benefit from more 
guidance. 
                                                                                                    
186 As I detail in Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equality from 
Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore 36-38 (2003), Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 US 
663 (1966), the Supreme Court case striking down the use of poll taxes in state elections, came to 
the Supreme Court under a statute mandating Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. Internally, the 
case appeared headed for a 6-3 summary affirmance of the lower court’s upholding of the poll tax.  
Justice Goldberg wrote a draft dissent for three justices, reprinted in Appendix 2 of my book.  In 
that draft dissent, Justice Goldberg wrote in the first footnote of the differences between 
considering a case brought up on appeal compared to a case coming up on a writ of certiorari, 
whose denial says nothing about the Court’s view of the merits.  “However, this is an appeal, 
which by statute we must and do determine on the merits.  Whatever[] may have been my decision 
as to whether or not certiorari should be granted on this issue, since his case is an appeal, I am 
compelled to face up to the substantial constitutional issue presented.”  (Citation omitted).  
Similarly, it may be that some Justices considering the Citizens United case on mandatory appeal 
feel compelled to face the constitutional questions, even if the questions were not raised in the 
jurisdictional statement and were abandoned in the court below. Of course, NAMUDNO too 
reached the Court through mandatory appellate jurisdiction, yet only Justice Thomas reached the 
constitutional question. 
187 See generally Hasen, 94 Minn L Rev 1064 (cited in note 136). 
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Such use of the anti-avoidance tool is not unprecedented. Perhaps the 
Court’s refusal to apply the avoidance canon to save the Detainee Treatment Act 
of 2005 in Boumendine188 was a way for the Court to warn Congress off further 
attempts to deny basic trial rights to Guantanamo detainees. Conservative Justices 
skeptical of the Court’s abortion rights jurisprudence see anti-avoidance there too: 
construing ambiguous abortion statutes to raise constitutional problems chills new 
abortion-related legislation.  Justice Kennedy made the point in Gonzales v 
Carhart,189 but he was not the first.  The idea seems to have originated with 
Justice White’s dissent in Thornburgh v American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists.190 There, Justice White argued that “[t]he Court’s rejection of a 
perfectly plausible reading of [an abortion] statute flies in the face of the 
principle—which until today I had thought applicable to abortion statutes as well 
as to other legislative enactments—that ‘[w]here fairly possible, courts should 
construe a statute to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality.’  The Court’s reading 
is obviously based on an entirely different principle: that in cases involving 
abortion, a permissible reading of a statute is to be avoided at all costs.”191  
Though the fruitful dialogue theory sounds plausible, it is not clear that it 
explains the actual thinking of the Justices.  The explanation views the Court as 
bending over backwards in NAMUDNO to spur Congressional dialogue on the 
constitutionality of race-based remedies in voting, dialogue which the Congress 
showed in 2006 it had no interest in undertaking.  From oral argument, it did not 
sound like members of the Court had much interest in dialogue either.  Justice 
Scalia pointedly noted that the 2006 renewal passed 98-0 in the Senate, and on a 
similarly lopsided vote in the House, asking: “You know, the -- the Israeli 
Supreme Court, the Sanhedrin, used to have a rule that if the death penalty was 
pronounced unanimously, it was invalid, because there must be something wrong 
there. Do you ever expect -- do you ever seriously expect Congress to vote 
against a reextension of the Voting Rights Act? Do you really think that any 
incumbent would -- would vote to do that?”192 
It seems more accurate to say that the liberals, led by Justice Souter, were 
looking for some way to avoid an adverse ruling striking down section 5 as 
unconstitutional, and that the conservatives were ready to strike down Section 5.  
                                                                                                    
188 See note 58 above and accompanying text. 
189 550 US at 153. 
190 476 US 757 (1986).   
191 Id at 812 (White dissenting) (internal citation omitted); see also id at 829 (O’Connor 
dissenting) (same); Stenberg v Carhart, 530 US 914, 977 (2000) (same). 
192 Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v Holder, Oral Argument Transcript, 
Apr. 29, 2009, at 51, online at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-322.pdf (visited Sept 1, 
2009). 
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Why everyone but Justice Thomas agreed to go along with a very weak avoidance 
interpretation seems driven less by a desire for dialogue with Congress than from 
fear193 or strategic calculation. It is to these alternatives that I now turn. 
 
Political legitimacy.   The political legitimacy explanation posits that the 
Court uses the constitutional avoidance doctrine when it fears that full-blown 
constitutional pronouncement would harm its legitimacy.194  Some evidence 
supports this understanding of NAMUDNO and the reargument order in Citizens 
United. During the same term that the Court avoided the constitutional issue in 
NAMUDNO, it used the same avoidance canon to narrowly construe a different 
provision of the Voting Rights Act in Bartlett v Strickland,195 and it applied 
constitutional avoidance (in deed if not in name) to narrowly construe Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act in Ricci v DeStefano,196 the controversial New Haven 
firefighters case.  Each of these cases involved tough questions of race relations 
whose resolution could harm the Court’s legitimacy.197  A Court fearful of 
                                                                                                    
193 As Heather Gerken observed: “The real worry for supporters of Section 5 is the possibility that 
the Court’s liberals thought that sending a crystal clear, united message to Congress was Section 
5's best hope. That is, the four Justices on the Court may have been as convinced as many 
commentators are that Section 5 will fall when the case returns, and they were hoping that a 
unanimous opinion would light a fire under Congress.” Gerken: Can Congress Take a Hint?, 
Election Law Blog, Jun. 23, 2009, online at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013911.html 
(visited Sept. 1, 2009).  On the message the Court conservatives might have been sending to 
Congress, see Ellen Katz, Ellen Katz: Roberts Didn’t Blink, Election Law Blog, June 24, 2009, 
online at  http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013926.html (visited Sept 1, 2009) and Richard H. 
Pildes, A Warning to Congress, N.Y. Times Room for Debate Blog, June 22, 2009, online at 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/the-battle-not-the-war-on-voting-
rights/?scp=1&sq=Pildes&st=cse#richard (visited Sept 1, 2009)..   
194 For some early expressions of these ideas, see Bruce Ackerman, Section Five and the on-going 
canonization of the civil rights movement, Balkinization Blog, June 22, 2009, online at  
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/section-five-and-on-going-canonization.html (visited Sept 1, 
2009); Jack Balkin, Why Has the Roberts Court Suddenly Gone Minimalist?, Balkinization Blog, 
June 29, 2009, online at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/why-has-roberts-court-gone-
minimalist.html (visited Sept 1, 2009); Guest Post: Behind the Scenes in NAMUDNO, Election 
Law Blog, June 24, 2009, online at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013932.html (visited Sept 
12, 2009). On the debate over whether the Roberts Court’s decision in NAMUDNO was an act of 
“statesmanship,” see Sam Issacharoff, Issacharoff: On Statesmanship, Election Law Blog, June 
24, 2009, online at  http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013927.html (visited Sept 1, 2009) and 
Dahlia Lithwick, Our Judges with Attitude, Slate, June 26, 2009, online at  
http://www.slate.com/id/2220927/entry/2221700/ (visited Sept. 1, 2009). 
195 129 S Ct 1231 (2009).  
196  129 S Ct  2658 (2009). 
197 The Ricci case in particular dominated the news in the days after the opinion, especially as one 
of the judges on the Second Circuit panel, reversed by the Supreme Court, was then-nominee 
Judge Sotomayor. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1436669




Congressional or public reaction, especially with the other two branches 
dominated by the more liberal Democrats, just might have blinked.198 
 In contrast, campaign finance issues are much lower salience to the 
public,199 and are less likely to arouse the passion of interest groups and perhaps 
the ire of Congress.  A court concerned about political legitimacy might think it 
has a great deal more latitude in how it deals with questions of money in politics 
than with fundamental questions of race relations.  Under this reading, the Court 
can afford anti-avoidance when it comes to lower salience questions such as 
campaign finance, but it needs avoidance to quell the racial waters.   
While that explanation seems to make sense viewing these two cases 
alone, it is harder to square with the use of anti-avoidance in the abortion context, 
which is much higher salience.  Perhaps another factor is at work: how convinced 
the Court is that the government action is unconstitutional.  This would tie 
together elements of legitimacy and fixability. 
 
Political calculus.  The political calculus explanation is that the Court 
uses constitutional avoidance and similar doctrines (such as the use of “as 
applied” constitutional challenges200) to soften public and Congressional 
resistance to the Court’s efforts to move the law in the Justices’ preferred policy 
direction.201 Like the political legitimacy argument, the political calculus 
argument too is one about the Court’s legitimacy, but it is one that views the 
Court as strategically pursuing an agenda, rather than as fearfully anticipating a 
backlash.  It advances a view of the Court, and of the Chief Justice in particular, 
as sophisticated and calculating.  A recent portrayal of Chief Justice Roberts in a 
critical New Yorker article by Jeffrey Toobin referred to the Chief as a “stealth 
hard liner.”202   The view also has echoes in Justice Scalia’s lament in the WRTL 
                                                                                                    
198 Rick Hasen, Initial Thoughts on NAMUDNO: Chief Justice Roberts Blinked, Election Law 
Blog, Jun. 22, 2009, online at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013903.html (visited Sept 1, 
2009). 
199 Glenn H. Utter & Ruth Ann Strickland, Campaign and Election Reform 192 (2d ed. ABC-
CLIO, Inc. 2008) (“Americans typically have not viewed campaign finance reform as a top 
priority for the federal government to address”). 
200 See Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy?: The Changing Nature 
and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Supreme Court's Recent Election Law 
Decisions, 93 Minn L Rev 1644 (2009), and Joshua A. Douglas, The Significance of the Shift 
Toward As-Applied Challenges in Election Law, 37 Hofstra L Rev 635 (2009). 
201 Mark Tushnet, How the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Ricci v. DeStefano Hints at Trouble 
Ahead, Dissent, July 12, 2009, online at http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=270 (visited 
Sept 1, 2009). 
202 Jeffrey Toobin, Annals of Law: No More Mr. Nice Guy: The Supreme Court’s Stealth Hard 
Liner, New Yorker, May 25, 2009, online at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/05/25/090525fa_fact_toobin (visited Sept 1, 2009).  
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II case that the Roberts-Alito “as applied” decision on BCRA section 203 was 
“faux judicial restraint.”203 
Under this positive political theory explanation204 of the Court’s actions, 
the difference between NAMUDNO and Citizens United is simply one of timing.  
The Court had already laid the groundwork for a deregulatory campaign finance 
regime through its earlier campaign finance rulings which exhibited some of that 
faux judicial restraint: it is now ready to put a stake in the heart of the corporate 
spending limits, if not in Citizens United, than in another challenge soon to come.  
If that reading is correct, the Voting Rights Act’s time of demise will come, and 
the public will come to expect it once the Court first raised constitutional doubts 
in NAMUDNO.  The avoidance canon is just another doctrinal tool in the Court’s 
arsenal to move constitutional law and policy in the Court’s direction and at the 
Court’s chosen speed.  
  Tom Goldstein seems to take this view of the Court, seeing the 
conservative majority using the avoidance doctrine and similar doctrines as laying 
the groundwork for subsequent overruling. 
I am struck in particular by the opinions of the Chief Justice that 
seem to lay down markers that will be followed in later generations 
of cases.  NAMUDNO details constitutional objections to Section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act that seem ready-made for a later decision 
invalidating the statute if it is not amended….   
If I’m right about the direction of the case law, the Court’s 
methodology is striking.  It is reinforcing its own legitimacy with 
opinions that later can be cited to demonstrate that it is not rapidly 
or radically changing the law.  This approach may be in the 
starkest relief if next Term the Court cites its recent decision in 
Wisconsin Right to Life as precedent for concluding that 
McConnell v. FEC and Austin v. Michigan have been significantly 
undermined and should be overruled.  The plurality and 
concurrence in Wisconsin Right to Life famously debated how 
aggressively the Court should go in overruling prior campaign 
                                                                                                    
203 WRTL II, 127 S  Ct  at 2683-84 n.7 (Scalia concurring). 
204 Positive political theory views political actors seeking to maximize their preferences within 
institutional constraints.  For an introduction to the concept as applied to statutory interpretation 
and interactions between the Supreme Court and Congress (and within each institution), see 
Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation at 75-76 (cited in note 12).  
More technically sophisticated versions of PPT use game theory to model these interactions, and 
consider as well the role of the executive.  The basic idea of PPT in the Supreme Court-Congress 
game is that a majority of Court Justices seeks to move statutory law in its preferred policy 
direction without facing overruling by the Congress through amended legislation. 
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finance precedent.  The Chief Justice urged patience – not moving 
more quickly than required – and the wait may not have been 
long.205 
 The political calculus explanation meshes particularly well with the 
peculiar nature of the NAMUDNO statutory decision.  Ordinarily when Congress 
considers overriding a statutory interpretation decision of the Supreme Court, 
doing so will restore a popular law enacted by Congress (leaving open the 
possibility that the Court will later strike the law down on constitutional 
grounds).206  Here, the situation is different: Congress is not going to consider 
overriding the Court’s interpretation of the bailout provision in the Voting Rights 
Act; there is not much to gain by doing so (we do not know how many 
jurisdictions will now seek bailout that could not before) and an override could 
goad the Court into striking down section 5.  Either Congress will do nothing—in 
which case the Court has laid the groundwork for invalidating section 5 in a 
future case—or the Congress will pass legislation watering down section 5’s key 
provisions to please the conservatives on the Court.  It is a win-win situation for a 
Court making strategic calculations to move the law towards its policy 
preferences. 
* * * 
As I noted, we do not have enough data from the cases to know which of 
these three explanations for alternating avoidance and anti-avoidance best 
represent reality.  Likely one’s views on which explanation coheres best 
correlates with one’s views on the general motivations and sincerity of the 
Justices on the Supreme Court.  But it is simply too early to tell, and always 
hazardous to generalize about the actions of a multi-member body.207 Some 
members of the Court may be concerned about its legitimacy; others may wish to 
engage in a dialogue; others may be acting more strategically. Perhaps the 
simplest explanation of the divergence in the cases is Justice Kennedy’s different 
position in the two cases. 
 One test of the theories may come if Congress does nothing to amend the 
VRA or it amends the Voting Rights Act but not in any way that meaningfully 
                                                                                                    
205 Tom Goldstein, Thoughts on This Term and the Next, SCOTUSblog, June 29, 2009, online at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/thoughts-on-this-term-and-the-next/ (visited Sept 1, 2009). 
206 On the nature and frequency of statutory overrides from a positive political theory perspective, 
see William N. Eskridge, Overriding  Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale 
LJ 331; Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals of 
Supreme Court Decisions, 16 Int’l Rev L & Econ 503 (1996). 
207 For a classic PPT criticism of the concept of collective congressional intent, see Kenneth 
Shepsle, Congress is a “We,” Not an “It:” Congressional Intent as an Oxymoron, 12 Int’l Rev L 
& Econ 239 (1992).  As applied to courts, see Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They Not an 
It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J Contemp Legal Issues 549 (2005). 
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addresses the Court’s concerns in NAMUDNO.  A Court that does not act then to 
strike down the Act looks more like one motivated by fear;208 a Court that strikes 
down section 5, citing the earlier warnings in NAMUDNO, may fit more into the 
political calculus explanation.  Then again, at that point a Court that seeks to 
encourage fruitful dialogue with Congress might simply give up on the Congress 




 The Supreme Court can choose at will to use the avoidance canon or anti-
avoidance for myriad purposes.209  Looking at the Warren Court, Phil Frickey 
viewed the canon as being used to further civil liberties in a time of irrational fear 
of communists.210  He suggested avoidance could come in handy for the Roberts 
Court too as a way of furthering civil liberties, by cutting back on Congress’s 
overreaching in the terrorist cases.211  Writing at the beginning of the Roberts 
Court’s term, Neal Devins disagreed with Frickey on this point, stating a belief 
that the Roberts Court would not likely rely much on the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance.212  First, Devins said, Congress is less engaged in 
constitutional matters and less interested in dialogue than during the Warren 
Court era. Second, Congress does not seem poised to strike back at the Court.  
And third, Congress did not significantly respond during the Rehnquist Court era 
when the Court struck down all or part of 31 statutes on federalist grounds, so 
there is no reason for the Court to fear Congress.213 
 Devins may have been wrong about the Court’s interest in dialogue with 
Congress, at least as to those statutes, like the VRA, which might be 
constitutionally saved.  The Court may be embarking on a new era of dialogue 
with Congress, at least for “fixable” statutes. 
 Then again, even if the Roberts Court has no interest in dialogue, or in 
protecting civil liberties at a time of national peril, the Court still may find good 
reason for selective use of avoidance and anti-avoidance.  The rare use of anti-
                                                                                                    
208 See Ackerman (cited in note 194) (“If Roberts and Kennedy don’t have the courage of their 
convictions now, will they really lead the charge when the Obama justices are forcefully resisting, 
and legal momentum is on their side?”). 
209 See Harold J. Krent, Avoidance and Its Costs: Application of the Clear Statement Rule to 
Supreme Court Review of NLRB Cases, 15 Conn L Rev 1,1 (1983) (noting the “great latitude” 
avoidance-like doctrines give to the Supreme Court and the ad hoc nature of some Court decisions 
to invoke the avoidance canon). 
210 Frickey, 93 Cal L Rev 397 (cited in note 33). 
211 Id at 463-64. 
212 Devins, 32 U Dayton L Rev at 345 (cited in note 32). 
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avoidance lays down constitutional markers and builds a fence around the 
majority’s view of proper constitutional boundaries. The avoidance canon gives 
the public appearance of a Court moving moderately and slowly.  Notably, the 
headlines after NAMUDNO were about the Court “upholding” and “preserving” 
though “narrowing” the VRA,214 not about it taking the next step towards striking 
the VRA down. If the agenda of the Roberts Court is major change in 
constitutional law, the calculation may be that medicine usually goes down more 
palatably when in small doses.  
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